History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel (www.historyoflogic.com)

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Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Buddhism

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1. "Logic in Buddhism." 2004. *Horin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11.
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2. Aviv, Eyal. 2015. "A Well-Reasoned Dharma: Buddhist Logic in Republican China." *Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies* no. 28:189-234.
Abstract: "The rediscovery of Buddhist logic (Sanskrit *hetuvidyā, yinming*) in early 20th century China was a key element in the Chinese Buddhist response to modernity. I argue that while Buddhist intellectuals used Buddhist logic for different purposes, their shared goal was to demonstrate that Buddhism was not only modern but also that it was and is indispensable for the modern project. The article addresses two reasons for the renewed interest in Buddhist logic. Firstly, the revival should be understood in the context of logic's newly gained authority and significance in the early part of the 20th century in China.
Secondly, the rise of Buddhist logic was a product of doctrinal debates within Buddhism. With globalization and growing foreign influence, Chinese Buddhists revisited Buddhist teachings that were in the margins for centuries.
These teachings, primarily from the Yogācāra schools, challenged ubiquitous views in Chinese Buddhism. Buddhist logic was not only one of the doctrines that was rediscovered, but it was also one of the most effective tools in anskritdebating the nature and future of Buddhism in modern China."

3. Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1979. "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Pramā and Pramāna." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 7:43-78.
"The article seeks to introduce Dharmakīrti's theory of identity between Prama and Pramana, i.e., valid knowledge and its means. Knowing is nothing but feeling an object-shape stamped upon knowledge. This cognitive object-stamp is the immediate means to knowledge, being the direct measure of its object and as such is not really different from the structure of knowledge itself. The difference is thus only an analytical abstraction having no causal import. Many other systems, even Kumarila Mimansa, on close examination, are reduced to the same position, barring the Nyaya which firmly holds the difference."

4. Basso, Pierre. 1988. "Language for a Causal Conditional Logic Foundations and Objectives." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 16:123-166.

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11. Chatterji, Durgacharan. 1932. "Buddhist Logic (An Introductory Survey)." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 13:77-85.

12. Chattopadhyay, Madhumita. 2022. "Introduction to Buddhist Logicians and their Texts." In *Handbook of Logical Thought in India*, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.
Abstract: "From the origin of Buddhism in the sixth century BC to its expansion into four schools, logic was not looked upon as an independent branch of study within philosophy, though scattered uses of logical concepts and arguments were not rare in early Buddhist literature. Since the middle of fifth century AD, Buddhist logic developed into an independent area of study. This was possible because of the contributions of some great Buddhist thinkers who tried to develop logic not only as an independent study but also as a formal system where one can validly infer an unapprehended phenomenon on the basis of an apprehended phenomenon. Rules were also developed for turning debate into a rational enterprise. Pioneering works in the field of logic were done by Dignāga, who was considered to be the father of Buddhist logic, and Dharmakīrti. Later Buddhist thinkers were more or less engaged in the discussion of logical issues dealt by these two great thinkers and tried to defend the Buddhist position against the attacks of the opponents, both of Brāhmaṇical and non-Brāhmaṇical schools. It is in course of such counterattacks and defenses that Buddhist logic developed to have a position of its own in Indian philosophy."

13. Cheng, Hsueh-li. 1984. *Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources*. New York: Philosophical Library.
Reprint: New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.

14. Chi, Richard S. Y. 1969. *Buddhist Formal Logic: A Study of Dignāga's Hetucakra and K'Uei-Chi's Great Commentary on the Nyayapravesa*. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
Part I. A study of Dignāga's *Hetucakra* and K'uei-chi's *Great commentary* on the *Nyayapraveda*.
Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984; with "A Bibliography of Indian and Buddhist Logic", pp. 185-222.
"The Blbllograpby ls ln two parts:
Bibliography A. Oriental texts before +1800, arranged ln alphabetical order of the titles. [pp. 185-197]
BlbllographJ B. Books and articles after +1800, arranged In alphabetical order of the authors. [pp. 199-222]
Works on western loglc, exrcept a few which particularly discuss Indian Logic, are not included in the Blbllograpby.
Bibliography B includes both works on the theory of loglc and those on the application of. loglc to phllosophy." (Preface, P. LXXI)

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"The paper attempts to show that the difference between "Nyaya" and Buddhism is not merely verbal, but has varied philosophical implications, due to which Nyaya-Buddhist controversy occupies a very important position in the history of indian philosophical thought. This is vindicated with reference to some of the important and significant issues, viz. "sahtana" (the doctrine of universal flux), "anityata/ksanikata" (the doctrine of impermanence), and "vyapti (avinabhava-niyama)", which indicate marked differences between them in the field of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic."

19. ———. 1988. *Vādanyāya: A Glimpse of Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

20. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1975. "On Logic and "Algebraic and Geometric Logic"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 25:357-364.

21. ———. 1975. "Remarks on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism (Logic) and Mr. Tachikawa's Translation of the 'Nyāyapravesa'." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:383-398.

22. ———. 1977. "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Inscription of Buddhist Logic (*Nyaya*)." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 28 (2):221-231.

23. ———. 1979. "Metalogical Clichés (Proto-variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 20:549-558.
"This paper answers the question: are there variables in early Buddhist logic (Nyaya)? Thus the article describes 1) the implicit rules and sources for the correct substitution of 6th century Buddhist metalogical clichés (proto-variables), 2) some differences between such clichés and modern variables, 3) various metalogical theories and the crucial function of metaphysical presuppositions, and 4) offers a translation into the first order predicate calculus."

24. ———. 1979. "Empirical Falsifiability and the Frequence of *Darśana* Relevance in the Sixth Century Buddhist Logic of Sānkaravāmin." *Logique et Analyse* no. 86.

25. ———. 1981. "Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons." In *Buddhist and Western Philosophy: A Critical Comparative Study*, edited by Katz, Nathan, 54-79. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

26. ———. 1988. "On Translating the Term *"Drstanta"* in Early Buddhist Formal logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 38:147-156.

27. ———. 1991. "On Whether the Buddhist 'Syllogism' (Parārthānumāna) is a Sui Generis Inference." *Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East* no. 1:175-183.

28. Deguchi, Yasuo, Garfield, Jay L., and Priest, Graham. 2008. "The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 58:395-402.

29. Dorfman, Michael. 2014. "Putting the Madhyamaka Trick in Context: A Contextualist Reading of Huntington's Interpretation of Madhyamaka." *Buddhist Studies Review* no. 3:91-124.
Abstract: "In a series of works published over a period of twenty-five years, C.W. Huntington, Jr. has developed a provocative and radical reading of Madhyamaka (particularly Early Indian Madhyamaka) inspired by 'the insights of post-Wittgensteinian ragmatism and deconstruction' (1993, 9). This article examines the body of Huntington's work through the filter of his seminal 2007 publication, 'The Nature of the Mādhyamika Trick', a polemic aimed at a quartet of other recent commentators on Madhyamaka (Robinson, Hayes, Tillemans and Garfield) who attempt 'to read Nāgārjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic' (2007, 103), a project which is the 'end result of a long and complex scholastic enterprise …

[which] can be traced backwards from contemporary academic discourse to fifteenth century Tibet, and from there into India' (2007, 111) and which Huntington sees as distorting the Madhyamaka project which was not aimed at 'command[ing] assent to a set of rationally grounded doctrines, tenets, or true conclusions' (2007, 129), This article begins by explicating some disparate strands found in Huntington's work, which I connect under a radicalized notion of 'context'. These strands consist of a contextualist/pragmatic theory of truth (as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth), a contextualist epistemology (as opposed to one relying on foundationalist epistemic warrants), and a contextualist ontology where entities are viewed as necessarily relational (as opposed to possessing a context-independent essence.) I then use these linked theories to find fault with Huntington's own readings of Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna, arguing that Huntington misreads the semantic context of certain key terms (tarka, dṛṣṭi, pakṣa and pratijñā) and fails to follow the implications of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti's reliance on the role of the pramāṇas in constituting conventional reality. Thus, I find that Huntington's imputation of a rejection of logic and rational argumentation to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti is unwarranted. Finally, I offer alternate readings of the four contemporary commentators selected by Huntington, using the conceptual apparatus developed earlier to dismiss Robinson's and Hayes's view of Nāgārjuna as a charlatan relying on logical fallacies, and to find common ground between Huntington's project and the view of Nāgārjuna developed by Tillemans and Garfield as a thinker committed using reason to reach, through rational analysis, 'the limits of thought.'"

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Huntington, Jr., C.W., with Wangchen, Geshé Namgyal. 1993. *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika*. Delhi: Motilall Banarsidass.

———— . 2007. 'The nature of the Mādhyamika trick'. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35: 103–131.

30. Eckel, Malcolm David. 1978. "Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 28 (3):323-337.
"Evidence from Bhavaviveka's Orajnapradipa and Tarkajvala is used to show that Bhavaviveka makes an important contribution to the understanding of Nāgārjuna's arguments about the foundations of language. Bhavaviveka's arguments are then compared and contrasted with those of Candrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa."

31. Ellingson-Waugh, Ter. 1974. "Algebraic and Geometric Logic." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24:23-40.

32. Fathi, Karim. 2013. "Logic in Buddhism." In *Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions*, edited by Runehov, Anne L. C., Oviedo, Lluis and Azari, Nina P., 1168-1174. Dordrecht: Springer.

33. Fenner, Peter G. 1983. "Candrakirti's Refutation of Buddhist Idealism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 33 (3):251-261.
"A philosophical reconstruction of Candrakirti's critique of the Buddhist Vijnanavada as found in the "Madhyamakavatara". The basis of the refutation of idealism is (1) refuting the nonexternality of sense objects, (2) the failure of mental potentials to account for sensory experience and (3) the refutaton of apperception. the relevant verses of the "Madhyamakavatara" are translated in an appendix."

34. Franco, Eli. 2004. "Xuanzang's proof of idealism (*vijñaptimātra*)." *Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11:199-212.

35. Galloway, Brian. 1989. "Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka Thought." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 17:1-35.
"In this paper we should like to argue that the "Prasajya" negation of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy is not the same as that of the non-Madhyamaka schools (that is, that the distinction between "Prasajya" and

"Paryudasa" negation is not drawn in the same way). We should also like to argue that the terms and concepts of elementary set theory, employed in conjunction with the elementary predicate calculus, are useful in the explication of the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction and also in the clarification of the "Catuskoti". Finally we shall defend the Madhyamika Nāgārjuna against two charges that have been laid against him to the effect that he has been guilty of certain errors of reasoning."

36. Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.
I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."

37. ———. 2008. "An Early Buddhist Text on Logic: Fang Bian Xin Lun." *Argumentation* no. 22:15-25.

38. ———. 2013. "Language and Logic in Indian Buddhist Thought." In *A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy*, edited by Emmanuel, Steven M., 307-319. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

39. Gokhale, Pradeep P. 2022. "Buddhist Logic: Sample Texts." In *Handbook of Logical Thought in India*, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-20. Dordrecht: Delhi.
Abstract: "In this chapter, three sections from three different texts are chosen which discuss some of the core doctrines in Buddhist logic.
The first section, namely, *Nyāyapraveśakasūtram* discusses Diṅnāga's theory of inference which includes his theory of "inference for oneself" and "inference for others" and fallacies of inference including those of the thesis, reason, and instance.
The second section chosen from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* deals with "Inference for oneself." Dharmakīrti here tries to construct a comprehensive and tight framework of inference. Accordingly, *hetu* can be only of three kinds: s*vabhāva, kārya,* and *anupalabdhi.* Dharmakīrti in this chapter also explains the 11-fold classification of *anupalabdhi-hetu*.
The third section selected from Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* discusses formal logical issues concerning the inference for others. Here Dharmakīrti contends that the statements of *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti* are the only logically necessary and sufficient premises and that the statements of positive and negative concomitance entail each other such that only one of the two needs to be stated. This gives rise to two basic forms of inference which resemble Modus Ponuns and Modus Tollens."

40. Gokhale, Pradeep P., and Bhattacharya, Kuntala. 2022. "Some Issues in Buddhist Logic." In *Handbook of Logical Thought in India*, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-24. Dordrecht: Delhi.
Abstract: "The chapter deals with some important issues related to the Buddhist logic.
Since Nyāya logic is treated as the mainstream Indian logic by many scholars, the true nature and the real contribution of Buddhist logic are many a time overshadowed by the studies in Nyāya logic. The first issue discussed in the chapter, therefore, is the differences between the Buddhist and Nyāya logic.
Within the Buddhist logic, the contributions of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are many times studied in a combined (and confused) way. How one can distinguish between the two is the second issue.
Dharmakīrti is known for his view that probans-probandum relation should be a necessary relation, and this necessity can be derived from identity or causality. Some questions are raised such as whether identity leads to “internal pervasion” and how causal necessity can be ascertained. They are discussed in the third section.
The fourth issue is concerned with the logical consistency in prasaṅga method which was used as the core method of Mādhyamika Buddhism.
The last issue is concerned with the doctrine of apoha, which, though primarily concerned with word-world relation, is also concerned with the theory of inference in an indirect way."

41. Gold, Jonathan C. 2015. *Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu's Unifying Buddhist Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

42. ———. 2016. "Vasubandhu: Constructing a Buddhist Mainstream." In *The Buddhist World*, edited by Powers, John, 512-525. New York: Routledge.

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46. Heitmann, Annette L. 2004. "Insight into reality (*tattvajñāna*) as defined in 6th century Indian Madhyamaka." *Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11:213-221.

47. Herzberger, Hans G. 1975. "Double Negation in Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 3:3-16.
"The Apoha doctrine of Dignāga and his followers, presents a fascinating logical puzzle. While rejecting the classical law of double negation, it nevertheless requires a partial semantic equivalence between expression and their double negations. None of the principal nonstandard concepts of negation (classical, intuitionistic, three-valued) can do justice to this complex position. this paper undertakes a semantic reconstruction of the Apoha doctrine, using methods derived from Emil Post's work on the foundations of many-valued logic, especially the notion of a "two-fold" proposition."

48. Herzberger, Radikha, and Herzberger, Hans G. 1997. "Two Truths, or One?" In *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 278-300. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Thomas Mann begins his essay on Schopenhauer by telling us that the pleasures of metaphysics are mainly aesthetic.
Without sharing that high degree of philosophical detachment, we acknowledge that the present essay was motivated by aesthetic as well as historical concerns. Because it is part of an effort to understand Indian philosophers as particular individuals with distinctive problem situations and doctrines it is properly classified as historical.

Because it aims to locate particular doctrines within larger philosophical, visions, it might also be classified as aesthetic. Our essay develop's a long perspective going back to the early origins *of pramâna* theory. Drawing the reader back in time puts us in a better position to trace historical sources for certain important ideas of Dharmakīrti and Dinnaga, and to contrast the treatment of those ideas in their respective philosophical systems."

49. Ho, Chien-hsing. 2006. "Saying the Unsayable." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:409-427.

50. ———. 2012. "The Nonduality of Speech and Silence: A Comparative Analysis of Jizang's Thought on Language and Beyond." *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 11:1-19.
Abstract: "Jizang 吉藏(549−623 CE), the key philosophical exponent of the Sanlun 三論 school of Chinese Buddhism, based his philosophy considerably on his reading of the works of Nāgārjuna (c. 150−250 CE), the founder of the Indian Madhyamaka school. However, there are salient features in his thought on language that are notably absent from the works. In this article, I present a philosophical analysis of Jizang's views of the relationship between speech and silence and compare them with those of Nāgārjuna. It is shown that while Nāgārjuna leans toward affirming a clear-cut distinction between speech and ineffable quiescence, Jizang endorses the nonduality of conventional speech and sacred silence."

51. ———. 2013. "Ontic Indeterminacy and Paradoxical Language: A Philosophical Analysis of Sengzhao's Linguistic Thought." *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 12:505-522.
Abstract: "For Sengzhao 僧肇(374−414 CE), a leading Sanlun 三論 philosopher of Chinese Buddhism, things in the world are ontologically indeterminate in that they are devoid of any determinate form or nature. In his view, we should understand and use words provisionally, so that they are not taken to connote the determinacy of their referents. To echo the notion of ontic indeterminacy and indicate the provisionality of language, his main work, the Zhaolun 肇論, abounds in paradoxical expressions. In this essay, I offer a philosophical analysis and rational reconstruction of Sengzhao's linguistic thought, with a view to exploring the rationale for and purpose of his use of paradoxical language."

52. Hoffman, F. J. 1982. "Rationality in Early Buddhist Fourfold Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 10:309-337.

53. Hugon, Pascale. 2004. "Interpretations of the *trairūpya* in Tibet." *Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11:94-117.

54. ———. 2012. "Sa skya Paṇḍita's Classification of Arguments by Consequence Based on the Type of the Logical Reason: Editorial Conundrum and Mathematics for Commentators." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 46:845-887.
Abstract: "This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the *Rigs gter* of Sa skya Pand˙ita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (*thal ˀgyur*) of the form "Because S is P, it follows that it is Q" with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments
by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Pandita's Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and mTshur stongZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210) (see Hugon, in Journal of Indian Philosophy 44(5):883–938,

2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Pand˙ita's discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston's epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston's classification, even though mTshurston and Sa skya Pand˙ita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings."

55. ———. 2016. "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and His Successors on the Classification of Arguments by Consequence (*thal ʾgyur*) Based on the Type of the Logical Reason." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 44:883-938.

56. Huntington, C. W. Jr. 1983. "A "Nonreferential" View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work of Tson-kha-pa." *Philosophy East and West* no. 33:325-339.
"Part one of the work briefly describes Wittgenstein's theory of nonreferential meaning, as presented in Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and Buddhism". This theory is then applied to the interpretation of an essay by Tson-kha-pa dealing with the "two truths." Part two is an annotated translation of the Tson-kha-pa piece."

57. Ichimura, Shoei. 1981. "A Study on the Madhyamika Method of Refutation and Its Influence on Buddhist Logic." *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* no. 4:87-95.

58. ———. 1988. "On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation in terms of *Māyā-Drstānta* in the Indian and Chinese *Mādhyamikas*." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 36.

59. Iwata, Takashi. 2004. "On the concept of necessity in Buddhist texts - from the perspectives of the Yogacaras and the Buddhist logical tradition -." *Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11:57-81.

60. Jayatilleke, K. N. 1967. "The Logic of Four Alternatives." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:69-83.

61. Kantor, Hans-Rudolph. 2010. "'Right Words are Like the Reverse'—The Daoist Rhetoric and the Linguistic Strategy in Early Chinese Buddhism." *Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East* no. 20:283-307.
Abstract: "'Right words are like the reverse' is the concluding remark of chap. 78 in the Daoist classic *Daodejing*. Quoted in treatises composed by Seng Zhao (374–414), it designates the linguistic strategy used to unfold the Buddhist *Madhyamaka* meaning of 'emptiness' and 'ultimate truth'. In his treatise *Things Do not Move*, Seng Zhao demonstrates that 'motion and stillness' are not really contradictory, performing the deconstructive meaning of Buddhist 'emptiness' via the corresponding linguistic strategy. Though the topic of the discussion and the rhetoric are borrowed from Daoist sources, the point of view is rooted in the Buddhist understanding. The first section of this paper deals with the issue of exegetical methods in early Chinese Buddhism; the subsequent part explains both the Daoist background and the topics modified in Seng Zhao's discussions; the third part analyzes Seng Zhao's linguistic strategy and expounds its particular philosophical significance"

62. Kantor, Hans-Rudolph, and Salvini, Mattia. 2019. "Words, Concepts, and the Middle Way. Language in the Traditions of Madhyamaka Thought." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 47:603-611.

63. Katsura, Shoryu. 1996. *How Did the Buddhist Prove Something? -. The Nature of Buddhist Logic* --. Calgary, Alberta: The University of Calgary.
The Numata Chair in Buddhist Studies.

64. Kaul, Mrinal. 2022. "Causal Reasoning in the Trika Philosophy of Abhinavagupta." In *Handbook of Logical Thought in India*, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-29. Dordrecht: Delhi.
Abstract: "Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975–1025 CE) is a tantric philosopher whose rigorous epistemological discussions are deeply rooted in his Śaiva metaphysics. In order to strongly withhold the Trika doctrinal principle of non-duality, Abhinavagupta, like his predecessor Utpaladeva (fl.c. 925–975 CE), is struggling to interpret the philosophical question of causality that rests in the analysis of cause and effect or subject and object duality. In this chapter, a short example from his *magnum opus* tantric manual, the *Tantrāloka* (9.1–44), and its elaborate commentary titled -*viveka* by Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225–1275 CE) is discussed while also contextualizing the process of philosophical rationalization in the history of Trika Śaivism. The champions of the theory of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), the Buddhists, are precisely targeted, and following rational enquiry, Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha want to prove that Śiva alone is the supreme agent (*kartā*) or cause (*kāraṇa*) and He indeed is also the effect (*kārya*) since both cause and effect are the manifestation of and in a single consciousness. Even though the *Tantrāloka* is based on the revealed knowledge from early scriptures like the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, yet at every step, compelling efforts are being made to justify the revealed (*āgama*) knowledge with reason (*yukti*)."

65. Krasser, Helmut. 1995. "Dharmottara's Theory of Knowledge in His Laghupramanyapariksa." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 23:247-271.

66. Lance Factor, R. 1983. "What is the "Logic" in Buddhist Logic?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 33:183-188.
"In opposition to a contemporary interpretation of the influential Buddhist logic text, "Nyayapravesa" (Introduction to logical methods, circa 600 a. D.) which holds that its argument forms are not deductive and hence not comparable to Western notions of logic, I argue that its basic syllogisms are retroductive-deductive pairs. A Nyaya syllogism is virtually identical with the retroductive form expounded by C.S. Peirce and N. Hanson."

67. Lang, Karen C. 2013. "Candrakīrti on the Limits of Language and Logic." In *A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy*, edited by Emmanuel, Steven M., 331-348. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

68. Liberman, Kenneth. 2004. *Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning*. Lanham: RowmaN & Littlefield.

69. Lindtner, Christian. 1981. "Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:161-214.
"This paper presents a survey and an annotated translation (from Tibetan and Sanskrit) of the main Buddhist documents from II-X century a. D. dealing with the 'two truths', or two degrees of reality: a relative and an absolute. The former is the empirical world known to us through the senses and the usage of language. Submitted to sustained critical analysis it proves to be devoid of logical and ontological foundation. Enlightened individuals realizing that there is thus in fact only one truth -- the absolute -- nevertheless avail themselves of the convention of language in order to indicate what cannot be communicated but only 'personally intuited.' Thus the relative truth is pedagogically indispensable."

70. Liu, Ming-Wood. 1993. "A Chinese Madhyamaka Theory of Truth: The Case of Chi-tsang." *Philosophy East and West* no. 43:649-673.
"Chi-tsang (549-623) was the key figure in the revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth century, and his teaching is commonly acknowledged to be the apex of the development of Madhyamaka thought in China. This essay attempts to examine the conception of truth underlying a number of ideas generally considered as central to Chi-tsang's thought, including "refutation of falsehood", "revelation of truth" and "two truths"."

71. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1970. "Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:83-108.
"This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."

72. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Evans, Robert D., eds. 1986. *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Contents: Preface IX;
Bimal Krishna Matilal: Buddhist Logic and Epistemology 1; Richard P. Hayes: An Interpretation of *Anyāpoha* in Diṅnāga's General Theory of Inference 31; Hans G. Herberger: Three Systems of Buddhist Logic 59; Brendan S. Gillon: Dharmakīrti and His Theory of Inference 77; Kamaleswar Bhattacharya: Some Thoughts on *Antarvyāpti, Bahirvyāpti,* and *Trairūpya* 89; R. S. Y. Chi: Dirināga and Post-Russell Logic 107; Douglas Dunsmore Daye: Metalogical Remarks on the Procrustean Translation of the Buddhist *Parārthānumāna* into the Anglo-European Predicate Calculus 117; Michael Torsten Much: Dharmakīrti's Definition of "Points of Defeat" (Nigrahasthāna) 133; Radhika Herzberger: *Apoha* and *Śimśapāvrksa* 143; Shoryu Katsura: *JnānaśrImitra* on Apoha 171; K. Kunjunni Raja: Apoha Theory and Pre-Dinnaga Views on Sentence-meaning 185; Mark Siderits: Was Śāntarakṣita a "Positivist"? 193; Tom Tillemans: Identity and Referential Opacity in Tibetan Buddhist Apoha Theory 207; D. Seyfort Ruegg: Does the Mādhyamika Have a Thesis
and Philosophical Position? 229; Christian Lindtner: Bhavya's Critique of Yogācara in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Chapter IV 239; Malcolm David Eckel: The Concept of Reason in Jnānagarbha's *Svātantrika Madhyamaka* 265;L Gopikamohan Bhattacharya: Ratnakīrti on Apoha 291; Index 299-303.
"For the first time in recent history, seventeen scholars from all over the world (India, Japan, Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) collaborated here to produce a volume containing an in-depth study of Buddhist logical theory in the background of Buddhist epistemology. The Tibetan tradition identifies this important chapter in the history of Buddhist philosophy as the *pramāṇa* school. It owes its origin to the writings of the great Buddhist master, Dinnāga (circa A.D. 480-540), whose influence was to spread far beyond India, as well as to his celebrated interpreter of seventh century A. D., Dharmakīrti, whose texts presented the standard version of the school for the later Buddhist and non-Buddhist authors for a long time.
The history of Buddhist and Indian logical and epistemological theories constitutes an interesting study not only for the Buddhist scholars but also for philosophers as well as historians of philosophy in general. Each author of this anthology combines historical and philological scholarship with philosophical acumen and linguistic insight. Each of them uses original textual (Tibetan or Sanskirt) material to resolve logical issues and philosophical questions. Attention has been focused upon two crucial philosophical concepts: *trairūpya* (the "triple" character of evidence) and *apoha* (meaning as "exclusion"). Broadly the issues are concerned with the problems of inductive logic and the problem of meaning and universals. Besides,

some authors address themselves to the general question: why and in what sense does logical theory become relevant to Buddhism, especially to the philosophical soteriology such as Madhyamika?" (From the Preface)

73. McClintock, Sara L. 2010. *Oniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

74. McDermott, Charlene Senape A. 1969. *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of Exists*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

75. ———. 1970. "Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:22-29.
"One defense of the central tenets of Buddhist metaphysics by the Eleventh century logician, Ratnakirti, culminates in his development of a system broad enough to accommodate null subject terms -- an achievement proleptic of contemporary free logics. The article is intended as an implicit argument in favor of the utilization of formal logical structures as tools for explication in comparative philosophy."

76. ———. 1972. "Mr. Ruegg on Ratnakirti." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:16-19.
"This point-for-point response to Mr. D. S. Ruegg's criticisms of my "An Eleventh century Buddhist logic of 'exists'" is at the same time an argument for a true interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophers and indologists."

77. Misra, G. S. F. 1968. "Logical and Scientific Method in Early Buddhist Texts." *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* no. 1/2:54-64.

78. Nakamura, Hajime. 1958. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 7:375-395.

79. Olson, Robert F. 1974. "Candrakīrti's Critique of Vijñānavāda." *Philosophy East and West* no. 24:405-441.

80. Onoda, Shunzo. 1992. *Monastic Debate in Tibet: a study on the history and structures of bsdus grwa logic*. Wiem: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

81. Paul, Diana. 1979. "An Introductory Note to Paramārtha's Theory of Language." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 7:231-255.

82. Paul, Gregor. 2004. "Logic in Buddhist texts. With particular reference to the *Zhonglun*." *Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture* no. 11:39-56.

83. Payne, Richard K. 1987. "The Theory of Meaning in Buddhist Logicians: The Historical and Intellectual Context of Apoha." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 15:261-284.

84. Perdue, Daniel E. 1992. *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

85. ———. 2008. "The Tibetan Buddhist Syllogistic Form." *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* no. 21:193-211.

86. Priest, Graham. 2010. "The Logic of the *Catuskoti*." *Comparative Phlosophy* no. 1:24-54.

87. ———. 2015. "None of the Above: The Catuṣkoṭi in Indian Buddhist Logic " In *New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic*, edited by Beziau, Jean-Yves, Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma, 517-628. Dordrecht: Springer.

88. ———. 2022. "The *Catuṣkoṭi*, the *Saptabhaṇgī*, and “Non-Classical” Logic." In *Handbook of Logical Thought in India*, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-20. Dordrecht: Delhi.
Abstract: "The Principles of Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction are highly orthodox in Western philosophy. They are much less so in Indian philosophy.

Indeed, there are logical/metaphysical positions that clearly violate them. One of these is the Buddhist *catuṣkoṭi*; another is the Jain *saptabhaṇgī.* Contemporary Western logicians have, however, investigated systems of "non-classical" logic in which these principles fail, and some of these bear important relationships to the *catuṣkoṭi* and the *saptabhaṇgī.* In this essay, we will look at these two principles and see how these may inform and be informed by those systems."

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91. Rogers, Katherine Manchester. 2009. *Tibetan Logic*. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.

92. Ruegg, D. Seyfort. 1970. "On Ratnakīrti." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 1:300-309.

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94. Sadhukhan, Sanjit Kumar. 1994. "A Short History of Buddhist Logic in Tibet." *Bulletin of Tibetology* no. 3:7-56.

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96. Sharma, Dhirendra. 1966. "Epistemological Negative Dialectics of Indian Logic - Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi." *Indo-Iranian Journal* no. 9:291-300.

97. ———. 1968. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning (*Apoha*) and Negative Statements." *Philosophy East and West* no. 18:3-10.

98. ———. 1969. *The Differentation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*. The Hague: Mouton.

99. Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1974. "Empty Terms: the Nyāya and the Buddhists." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 2:332-343.
"The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists' conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of Sunyata, and to answer some of the questions raised by certain contemporary writers on Nyaya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. A comparison between Russell and the Nyaya has been drawn, and some of the questions raised by Quine have been discussed in this context."

100. ———. 1978. "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 6:59-77.
"The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. The Buddhist theory of meaning requires two types of negation for expressing the meaning of an expression. This discussion leads us to an investigation of the different senses of negation used in Indian logic. The first section deals with the different classifications of negation. The second section deals with professor Herzberger's explication of the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to our positive thesis the theory of meaning can be reconstructed in terms of two senses of negation."

101. Siderits, Mark. 1979. "A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 29:491-499.

102. ———. 1985. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Apoha." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 13:133-152.
"I show that the Buddhist philosophers Santaraksita and Kamalasila subscribed to the Indian equivalent of the context principle, according to which a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. I then discuss the manner in which they used the Buddhist exclusion (Apoha) theory of meaning to answer two major objections to that account of word meaning: the "hermeneutic circle" objection, and the objection that this account cannot explain our ability to understand novel sentences."

103. Stcherbatsky, Fedor Ippolitovich. 1930. *Buddhist Logic*. Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Two volumes (1930-1932).
Vol. 2 includes "A short treatise of logic (Nyaya-bindu) by Dharmakīrti with its commentary (Nyaya-bindu-tika) by Dharmottara translated from the Sanscrit text edited in the Biblioteca Buddhica."
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Erratum, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 18, 1990, p. 93.

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Abstract: "This chapter discusses some key concepts of Buddhist logic from different traditions. The first part deals with Nāgārjuna's prasaṅga technique and his claim that reality is empty (*śūnya*). The idea that the claim that everything is empty, if true, might be regarded as empty itself is discussed. The second part provides an overview of Diṅnāga's view on inference and his theory of the three conditions of an inferential sign (*hetu*). This theory is compared to the Nyāya view on inference and the question whether the second of Diṅnāga's conditions is redundant is raised. The third part explores Dharmakīrti's developments of Diṅnāga's view on inference, particularly his introduction of the particle eva and the three types of *hetu*. The final part of this chapter presents an outline of Diṅnāga's apoha (exclusion) theory of the meaning and function of concepts and words."

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"Though the Madhyamika school of Buddhism begins with Nāgārjuna's Mula Madhyamakakarika, modern scholar's interpretations of this work rely heavily on the commentaries of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti. These commentaries each reflect the so-called "Svatantrika-vs-Prasangika" debate, which became a Madhyamika preoccupation in later times. There are, however, two earlier commentaries which have been largely ignored. This article will demonstrate that one of these commentaries, theAkutobhaya, gives us a rendering of Nāgārjuna's logic that is perhaps closer to Nāgārjuna's own milieu than post-Dignāga commentaries, such as those of Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka. In this article, I show the ways that the formal argumentation of the Akutobhaya differs from the post-Dignāga logic and seems to conform more closely to an earlier standard set by the early Nyaya and Samkhya schools of logic. The result of this difference in logical methodology is subtle, but nevertheless has ramifications for Madhyamika doctrine."

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