Barnes, Jonathan. 1968. "Peripatetic Negations." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:201–215.

"Ancient logicians did not question the Aristotelian view that 'for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation' (de lnterpretatione 17a32-3); nor did they doubt that 'a single affirmation has a single negation' (17b37): every affirmation, P, has one and only one negation neg:P. Moreover, it was taken to be constitutive of the notion of negation that P and neg:P cannot both be true and cannot both be false.(1) And it was supposed that a negation, neg:P, will normally be constructed from its affirmative twin, P, together with a negative operator.(2)

Those common notions form the background to a short essay on negation which Alexander of Aphrodisias inserted into his commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Alexander defends an Aristotelian account of negation and argues against a rival account.(3) The rival account is generally supposed to be Stoic or even Chrysippean; and it contains indisputably Stoic elements. But Alexander does not name his opponents, nor does he offer any information about the history of the dispute.(4)" (pp. 201-202)

(1) It does not follow, nor was it generally accepted, that the Law of Bivalence has unrestricted validity.

(2) See e.g. Galen, Inst. Log. vi. 2 (where exceptions to the normal rule are noted).

(3) In Aristotelis Analytica Priora 402. 1-405. 16. Scholarly attention was first drawn to this passage b.y A. C. Lloyd, 'Definite Propositions and the Concept of Reference', in Les Stoiciens et leur logique, ed J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978). I have recently had the advantage of reading an unpublished paper by Paul Moraux on the passage. [Only after finishing this paper did I receive a copy of Walter Cavini's long paper on 'La Negazione di Frase nella Logica Greca', in Studi su Papiri Greci di Logica e Medicina, Accademia Toscana di scienze e lettere 'la Colombaria', Studi LXXIV, by W. Cavini, M. C. Donnini Maccio, M. S. Funghi, D. Manetti (Florence, 1985). Cavini discusses the passage from Alexander on pp 67-80; on pp 122-6 there is a thorough bibliography on Greek negation.]

(4) Alexander is not normally reluctant to name his opponents or to refer to the Stoics.

He frequently speaks of Στοικοι οι απο τής Στοας or οι νεώτεροι, and he more than once cites Chrysippus by name. In the essay on negation, however, the opponents remain anonymous (they are introduced impersonally at 402. είοι... οίς δοκεΐ-and never later identified); and that is perhaps an indication that the men in question were not simply identifiable as Stoics or Chrysippeans.
Bobzien, Susanne. 2000. "Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 45:87–137.

Abstract: "In antiquity we encounter a distinction of two types of hypothetical syllogisms.

One type are the 'mixed hypothetical syllogisms'. The other type is the one to which the present paper is devoted. These arguments went by the name of 'wholly hypothetical syllogisms'. They were thought to make up a self-contained system of valid arguments. Their paradigm case consists of two conditionals as premisses, and a third as conclusion. Their presentation, either schematically or by example, varies in different authors. For instance, we find 'If (it is) A, (it is) B; if (it is) B, (it is) C; therefore, if (it is) A, (it is) C'. The main contentious point about these arguments is what the ancients thought their logical form was.

Are A, B, C schematic letters for terms or propositions? Is 'is', where it occurs, predicative, existential, or veridical? That is, should 'ἐστι' be translated as 'it is an A', 'A exists', 'As exist' or 'It is true/the case that A'? If A, B, C are term letters, and 'is' is predicative, are the conditionals quantified propositions or do they contain designators? If one cannot answer these questions, one can hardly claim to know what sort of arguments the wholly hypothetical syllogisms were.

In fact, all the above-mentioned possibilities have been taken to describe them correctly. In this paper I argue that it would be mistaken to assume that in antiquity there was one prevalent understanding of the logical form of these arguments - even if the ancients thought they were all talking about the same kind of argument. Rather, there was a complex development in their understanding, starting from a term-logical conception and leading to a propositional-logical one.

I trace this development from Aristotle to Philoponus and set out the deductive system on which the logic of the wholly hypothetical syllogisms was grounded."
———. 2014. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Theory of the Stoic Indemonstrables." In Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic, edited by Lee, Mi-Kyoung, 199–227. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In her important 1979 paper “Aristoteles über Syllogismen ‘aufgrund einer Hypothese,’(1) Gisela Striker provided an in-depth analysis of these vexing and perplexing Aristotelian arguments. She showed that they were Aristotle’s way of providing a logical vehicle for inferences based on other than term-logical relations; that the “hypothesis” that gives them their name is best understood as a rule that is not based on a relation of terms,(2) rather than as a premise; and that in those arguments “the thing taken instead” (τὸ μεταλαμβανόμενον) is an assertion that is used instead of the demonstrandum.(3) It was upon reading this paper that I realized that the (then) prevalent interpretation of later ancient texts on hypothetical syllogisms as presenting the Stoic theory of indemonstrables needed a thorough revision. For it is possible to show that, starting from Aristotle’s “syllogisms based on a hypothesis,” a specifically Peripatetic (and from the third century CE also partly Platonist) development can be traced through the centuries up to the late ancient passages on hypothetical syllogistic in Philoponus and Boethius. Although the Stoic indemonstrables undoubtedly played a role in this development, the various theories of hypothetical syllogisms over the centuries are all Peripatetic (and sometimes a little Platonist) in form, function, and terminology.(4) The present paper looks at Alexander of Aphrodisias’ role in this development." (p. 199)

(1) Striker [1979]. See now also Striker [2009], 174–8, 201, 237–238.

(2) Striker [1979], 46.

(3) Ibid., 43.

(4) Here I am in agreement with Maroth [1989]. The arguments the Stoics called hypothetical syllogisms were completely different from those the Peripatetics called hypothetical syllogisms: see my [1997].

References

Bobzien, S. [1997] “The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Argument,” Phronesis 42(3), 299–312.

Maroth, M. [1989], Ibn Sina und die peripatetische “Aussagenlogik” (Leiden: Brill).

Striker, G. [1979] “Aristoteles über Syllogismen ‘aufgrund einer Hypothese,’ ” Hermes 107, 33–50.

Striker, G. [2009] Aristotle, Prior Analytics: Book I (Oxford: OUP).
Castelli, Laura M. 2015. "Alexander on Aristotle, An. Pr., I, 31, Division and Syllogistic." Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale no. 26:33–54.

Abstract: "An. Pr., I, 31 is one of the several passages Aristotle devotes to the method of division.

From other texts we know that he is not unwilling to make room for a constructive use of division within the search for and the formulation of definitions. However, in An. Pr., I, 31 the basic issue seems to be whether division understood as a procedure typically embedded in a standardized argumentative practice can be regarded as a part of a general deductive method. Although the results of Aristotle’s discussion in this chapter are mainly negative, I shall argue that Alexander takes seriously the idea that division might actually play some role in the formulation of some deductive arguments. In spelling out this proposal, Alexander relies on a theory of deductive arguments much richer than Aristotle’s syllogistic in the Analytics and provides a systematic theoretical framework to interpret Aristotle’s claim that division is only a ‘small part’ of syllogistic."
Fazzo, Silvia. 2023. "Aporiai with Multiple Solutions in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 277–286. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Flannery, Kevin. 1993. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and Others on a Controversial Demonstration in Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 14:201–214.

Abstract: "Aristotle's treatment of mixed, first-figure, problematic-assertoric syllogisms has generated a good deal of controversy among modern commentators. I argue that W. D. Ross's criticism of A. Becker's criticism of Aristotle's treatment is unsuccessful. I then attempt to justify Aristotle's treatment, employing some ideas found in Alexander of Aphrodisias."
———. 1995. Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Leiden: Brill.

"The present work is intended to be an introduction to Alexander's logic. A point-by-point treatment of Alexander's logical writings (besides being an enormous task) would not produce this. First of all, much of what might be called Alexander's logic is simply Aristotelian logic-and that falls beyond the scope of the intention I have just enunciated. Secondly, much of what is distinctive in Alexander's logical writings has to do with his dialogue with (or, perhaps more precisely, opposition to) the Stoic logical tradition. It is not my intention to go into this material either, except to the extent that it helps to explain Alexander's own ideas. (This occurs in chapter 3, for instance, where Alexander's dismissal of the Stoics' duplicating and non-differently concluding arguments sheds a good deal of light on his positive conception of Aristotelian syllogistic deduction.) I take up, rather, three themes, one from each of the main areas of traditional logic: the assertoric syllogistic,(12) the modal syllogistic, and the area of metalogical concerns. There will be aspects of Alexander's thought which, on account of this way of proceeding, I skip over; but this is inevitable in any introduction. The other possible concern-that the resulting account of Alexander's logic might be very disjointed-will be dispelled, I am quite sure, as the reader proceeds through it." (General Introduction, pp. XXI-XXII)

(12) Actually, my discussion of ecthesis also involves to a small extent the modal syllogistic but not in any essential way. The method of ecthesis itself belongs basically to the asseItoric syllogistic.
Flannery, Kevin. 2003. "Logic and Ontology in Alexannder of Aphrodisias's Commentary on Metaphysics IV." In Alessandro di Afrodisia e la «Metafisica» di Aristotele, edited by Movia, Giancarlo, 117–134. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

"What, therefore, can we say after this fairly detailed analysis of some passages in Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics? Three things. I affirm the first two with some confidence; the third is an hypothesis. I believe that I have demonstrated that, when he wrote in Metaph., Alexander was under the influence of a certain model of the proper method of doing philosophy, including first philosophy - that is, he was much attached to the demonstrative method found in the Posterior Analytics. On account of this attachment, he had an antipathy for going below the logical and linguistic level of analysis, to the level of signification. I believe that I have also demonstrated that, being so inclined, Alexander in in Metaph. also occasionally forces the reading a text. Often he offers us a series of possible interpretations of a text, thereby giving the appearance of objectivity; but, in fact, as we have seen in one such passage, even while doing so, he is capable of succumbing to this most common of academic temptations.

This brings me to the hypothesis. Of course, we cannot assume that mature scholars are never tempted to force a text, but there are also other factors that suggest that in Metaph. (or, at least, in Metaph. IV) is less mature than some other works of Alexander’s. We have seen that, in in APr., Alexander seems to adopt a more balanced approach: i.e., he seems to have a more exact understanding of the relationship between the logical and the non-logical. We have also seen that in in Metaph. he demonstrates a certain ignorance regarding the way in which the game of dialectics is played - an ignorance (I might add) that he does not demonstrate in his comment on the Topics.(57) Since there are references in in Top. to in APr. but not in in APr. to in Top.,(58) the order of composition that I would suggest is the following: in Metaph., in APr., in Top. This is, however, only an hypothesis; such issues demand a more thorough study than I can perform here." (p. 134)

(57) See, e.g., in Top. 577.5-15. It is noteworthy also that at in Metaph. 204.13-14, Alexander says that something in fact found in Top. is found in APo., suggesting with this that, at the time he was writing this section of in Metaph., he did not know Top. especially well.

(58) in Top. 7.11, 166.21.
Garin, Sergei. 2019. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on syllogistic reasoning." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition no. 13:32–47.

Abstract: "The article deals with ancient ideas on the nature of syllogistics on the example of Empire's official Peripatetic philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias. We interpret Alexander's position on the syllogistic form as a theory of constant function. Alexander offers a conjunctive and purely formal understanding of the nature of syllogistic necessity.

This approach to the modal properties of assertoric judgments differs from Theophrastus’ ontological position, who believed that modal characteristics of assertoric premises are determined by looking to the state-of-affairs to which they refer. Also the paper examines Theophrastus’ legacy of hypothetical syllogisms related to Alexander.

Stoic and Peripatetic versions are also compared against the background of Alexander's logical amalgamation. The article elucidates late “Peripatetic conservatism” regarding the hypothetical syllogistics. We discuss the syntax of propositional / term relations (ei to A, to B), tackling the problem of grammatical ellipsis."
Gaskin, Richard. 1993. "Alexander's Sea Battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 10." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 38:75–94.

"The tenth chapter of Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato(1) contains a treatment of fatalism and future truth which clearly harks back to Aristotle's famous 'Sea Battle' discussion in De Interpretatione (DI) 9.(2) Alexander's discussion has not yet been satisfatorily interpreted: this paper is intended to help remedy this lack." (p. 75)

(1) The text of the De Fato is available in Supplementum Aristotelicum II.ii. 164-212, ed. I. Bruns, Berlin, 1892. Bruns' text is reproduced in the commentary of R. Sharples: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London, Duckworth, 1983).

(2) The literature on DI 9 is vast: the references in the following footnotes are no more than highly selective samples: I am myself preparing a study of the chapter.
Gili, Luca. 2012. "Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Solution to the Puzzle of the Two Modal Barbaras: a Semantic Approach." Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale no. 23:35–64.

Abstract: "In this paper I dwell on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ reconstruction of a famous puzzle of Aristotle’s modal logic. Aristotle’s claim that a LX-L Barbara is a valid syllogism, whilst a XL-L Barbara is an invalid formula within the syllogistic system has been contested not only in recent times, but by ancient Peripatetics too. I show that Alexander accepted Aristotle’s claim, and criticized Theophrastus, who firstly contested the above thesis. My claim is that Alexander introduced a ‘dictum de omni et de nullo’ for modal propositions, and that, on the basis of it, he proved the validity of the LX-L Barbara syllogism. However, this proof is problematic, because it seems to be inconsistent with Alexander’s proof for the validity of the rules of conversions for modal propositions. I suggest that Alexander had good arguments for avoiding the above difficulty, by making appeal to his semantics for modal propositions. This semantics is at the same time a temporal semantics and is rooted in Alexander’s theory of predication. The second part of the paper offers a brief account of this semantics and presents its theoretical advantages."
———. 2015. "Categorical μὴ κατὰ χρόνον Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Modal Syllogistic." Apeiron no. 48:466–482.

Abstract: "In this paper I deal with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of categorical μὴ κατὰ χρόνον propositions, namely of propositions which are neither necessity nor contingency propositions, but which are true not only at a certain instant in time. I argue that these propositions are true at least at two instants in time, but their presentation does not commit Alexander to a revision of his general semantic scheme for modal propositions, in which he showed that categorical propositions are not necessity propositions, and thus cannot be true at every instant in time. In the last section, I shall argue that Alexander’s presentation of categorical μὴ κατὰ χρόνον propositions is linked to his theory of predication and that such a semantic framework may explain the apparently difficult classification of this set of propositions."
———. 2015. "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the heterodox dictum de omni et de nullo." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 36:114–128.

Abstract: "Aristotle’s explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as involving individuals (of which something is said ‘of every’, or of which something is said ‘of none’), or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects our understanding of Alexander’s syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic."
———. 2015. "A neglected source of Boethius’s « De syllogismo categorico." Mnemosyne:304–307.

Abstract: "This paper shows that Boethius's De syllogismo categorico had among its sources Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries on the Topics and on the Prior Analytics. The first of these sources has been neglected by scholars until now. Boethius's usage of these sources shows the originality of his logical treatise."
———. 2020. "Erotetic Logic, Uncertainty and Therapy: Galen and Alexander on Logic and Medicine." In Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and Answers: Diagnostics, Didactics, Dialectics, edited by Meeusen, Michiel, 108–132. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Syllogistic is grounded upon dialectics. Dialectics is a version of erotetic logic, because it deals with questions and answers. This paper intends to explore the erotetic logics of Galen and of Alexander of Aphrodisias in order to establish whether the differences in their logical systems correspond to differences in their understanding of medicine.

Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias were almost contemporaries. Both of them shared the idea that doctors should know logic to practice medicine. The radical difference between Alexander and Galen consists in the fact that Alexander has a modal logic,

whereas Galen does not. In other words, the premises—the answers in a dialogical exchange—include a modal operator for Alexander, but not for Galen. This absence is not without consequences. This will become clearer if one pays attention to the role of

contingency syllogistic within Alexander’s own account of medicine."
———. 2020. "Categories in Alexander of Aphrodisias." Ancient Philosophy no. 40:453–468.

"There is no reason to doubt that Alexander wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Both Simplicius (Simpl. In Cat. 1,16) and Olympiodorus refer to it (Olymp. In Cat. 13,24-35).(1) Alexander’s notion of ‘category’, however, has not received much attention after Prantl’s sketchy reconstruction (see Prantl 1955, 623-624). The loss of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories might explain this relative neglect." (p. 453)

(...)

"I intend to show what categories are for Alexander.5 No scholar has ever attempted (to my knowledge) to reconstruct Alexander’s concept of ‘category’ and this gap in the scholarly literature should probably be filled before any other undertaking concerning the lost commentary on the Categories. In my interpretation, Alexander maintains that a κατηγορία is, first and foremost, a ‘predication’, i.e., a linguistic structure of this form: ‘S-is-P’, where ‘S’ represents the grammatical subject, ‘is’ is the copula, and ‘P’ is the grammatical predicate. According to Alexander, there are as many κατηγορίαι as there are meanings of the copula ‘is’.

Different predications allow us to single out different types of predicates. If there are n predications (‘S-is₁-P’, ‘S-is₂-P’, ‘S-is3-P’… ‘S-is_n-P’), there will be n types of predicates (P₁, P₂, P₃, … P_n) such that ‘S-is₁-P₁’, ‘S-is₂-P₂’ … ‘S-isn-P_n’ are grammatical phrases, whereas ‘S-is₁-P₂’, ‘S-is₂-P₁’, ‘S-is₃-P₁… ‘S-is_n-_Pk(k=/=n)’ are not grammatical phrases.6 From the κατηγορία-predication is possible to deduce the κατηγορία qua class of predicates, but the former κατηγορία has an explanatory priority." (pp. 454-455)

(1) Barnes 2005, 23 casts doubts on the veracity of Olympiodorus’ account.

(5) There is an important debate on the status of the categories in Aristotle’s writings. The debate echoes the ancient discussions that are summarized by Boethius (PL 64, In Cat. 161ff.) and Simplicius (in Cat. 9,4-10,19). According to Simplicius, the Categories is a treatise about ten γένη (in Cat. 9,7), but commentators disagree about the nature of these γένη. According to some commentators, these γένη are mere words, for others they are beings, others maintain that they are concepts. Alexander, in turn, claims that these γένη are words that signify the concepts that represent the most simple beings (Simpl. In Cat. 10, 9-19). Simplicius’ account of Alexander’s opinion on the ‘goal’ (σκοπός) of the Categories is, however, not entirely reliable because it is suspiciously similar to Simplicius’ own opinion about the σκοπός of the treatise. Luna 2001, 79-84 has written enlightening pages on the different opinions held by the commentators on the σκοπός of the Categories, and she concludes that Alexander is likely to have maintained something different from what Simplicius attributes to him.

The modern debate on the status of Aristotle’s categories was inaugurated by Trendelenburg 1846 that argued that the distinction among the several categories relied on grammatical considerations.

Despite its early criticism by Bonitz 1853, 591-645, Trendelenburg’s opinion was highly influential.

For a detailed and dense summary of the interpretation of the status of the Aristotelian categories after Trendelenburg, see Oehler 1983, 67-96.

References

Barnes, J. 2005. ‘Les categories et les Catégories’ 11-80 in O. Bruun and L. Corti edd. Les Catégories et leur histoire. Paris: Vrin.

Bonitz, H. 1853. ‘Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles’ Sitzungsbericht der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna). Phil.-hist. Klasse 10: 591-645.

Oehler, K. 1983. Aristoteles. Kategorien. übersetzt und erläutert von K. Oehler. Akademie Verlag, Berlin.

Trendelenburg. A. 1846. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen. Berlin: G. Bethge.
Gili, Luca, and Podolak, Pietro. 2018. "Hugh Eterianus, Alexander of Aphrodisias and syllogistic demonstrations: a newly discovered fragment of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ « Commentary » on Aristotle’s « Posterior analytics »." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 29:137–184.

Abstract: "Hugh Eterianus (ca. 1110/1120-1182), an Italian theologian who worked in Byzantium as an advisor to Manuel I Comnenos, is the author of the treatise De sancto et immortali deo, where he argues against the Orthodox denial of the filioque. In this treatise, Hugh quotes from the works of Plato, Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. In chapter I, 4, Hugh includes a short passage from a certain ‘Alexander’ who commented on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. We show that this passage is a fragment from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the Posterior Analytics. This article includes a new edition of the fragment with an English translation and a philosophical commentary."
Guyomarc’h, Gweltaz. 2023. "The Services of Dialectic: Dialectic as an Instrument for Metaphysics in Alexander of Aphrodisias." In Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 249–276. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"It is commonplace to think that ancient commentators aimed to systematize Aristotle.

(...)

Alexander of Aphrodisias’ attempt to make metaphysics into a demonstrative science would be a prime example of such tendency.(4) More generally, his exegetical method is held to rest on a “systematic presupposition” and to aim for a “unified” or even “dogmatic Aristotelianism”.(5)

To put it plainly—I think this is painting too unilateral and simple a picture, and I would like to contribute, here, following others,(6) to enrich and detail it. To do so, I will look into Alexander’s usage of dialectical method in metaphysics, with particular interest for his exegesis of book Beta of the Metaphysics and his use of the aporetic method. Alexander’s aporetic method in the Quaestiones(7) as well as the one he puts to use in his commentary on Metaphysics Beta has led to the same diagnosis. In both cases, no “honest perplexity”(8) is displayed, and the Beta aporiae are not treated like genuine puzzles but rather as simple exposition devices.(9) In contrast to this view, I would like to show two things: first, that aporia retains an authentically exploratory function for Alexander; and, second, that Alexander’s use of aporia in metaphysics does not originate in systematization, but rather in the fulfillment of dialectic’s status as an organon within Aristotelian tradition." (pp. 249-250)

(4) Bonelli (2001).

(5) Donini (1994), pp. 5035 and 5042. See also, for instance, Moraux (2001), p. 252, Cerami (2016), p. 164 (“The ultimate goal of this agenda is to establish an all-embracing philosophical system capable of responding in the best possible way to the philosophical issues debated by his contemporaries”), and Frede (2017) (“In general, Alexander goes on the assumption that Aristotelian philosophy is a unified whole, providing systematically connected answers to virtually all the questions of philosophy recognized in his own time”).

(6) In particular Kupreeva (2017), with whom I am in complete agreement.

(7) Fazzo (2002), pp. 17–18. For a more nuanced view, see Rashed (2007), pp. 3–4.

(8) Cf. Madigan in Madigan and Dooley (1992), p. 79.

References

Bonelli, Maddalena (2001): Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Cerami, Cristina (2016): “Alexander of Aphrodisias”. In: Falcon, Andrea (Ed.): Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity. Leiden: Brill, pp. 160–179.

Donini, Pierluigi (1994): “Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica”. In: Haase, Wolfgang (Ed.): Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. Philosophie (Systematische Themen; Indirekte Überlieferungen; Allgemeines; Nachträge). Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, pp. 5027–5100.

Fazzo, Silvia (2002): Aporia e Sistema: la materia, la forma, il divino nelle Quaestiones di Alessandro di Afrodisia. Pisa: ETS.

Kupreeva, Inna (2017): “Aporia and Exegesis: Alexander of Aphrodisias”. In: Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis (Eds.): The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 228–247.

Madigan, Arthur, and Dooley, William E. (Trans.) (1992): Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2 and 3. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Moraux, Paul (2001): Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Band 3: Alexander von Aphrodisias Wulfgang Kullmann, Robert W. Sharples, and Jürgen Wiesner (Eds.). Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

Rashed, Marwan (2007): Essentialisme: Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
Kupreeva, Irina. 2023. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Principle of Non-Contradiction: The Argument “from Signification”." In Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 287–330. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Mignucci, Mario. 1985. "Logic and omniscience: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 3:219–246.

Reprinted as Chapter 9 in Andrea Falcon, Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.), Ancient Logic, Language, and Metaphysics: Selected Essays by Mario Mignucci, New York: Routledge 2020.
———. 1990. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Inference and Syllogism." In Estudios de historia de la logica. Actas del III Simposio de Historia de la Logica, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio, 381–412. Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate.
Todd, Robert B. 1976. "Alexander of Aphrodisias on De interpretastione 16a 26-29." Hermes no. 104:140–146.

"At de interpretatione i6a 26-29 Aristotle makes the brief assertion that names (ὄνοματα) exist by convention and not by nature. In his note on this text Ammonius, the fifth century Alexandrian commentator, reports that Alexander of Aphrodisias had proposed the following syllogism, presumably in his own commentary on this work which is no longer extant: ὄνοματα and ρέματα are sounds' (φοναι), sounds exist by nature, therefore so do ὄνοματα and ρέματα. Ammonius then proceeds to offer a refutation of this argument. Although he does not explicitly attribute this subsequent reasoning to Alexander I shall try to show in this note that he must be offering an account of the earlier exegete's thought, for all the essentials and some of the details of Ammonius' report can be paralleled in some philosophically interesting ways from texts in other Alexandrian works." (pp. 140-141, some notes omitted)

(3) In de int. 39, I7-32 Busse.
Weidemann, Hermann. 1996. "Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero, and Aristotle's Definition of Possibility." In Studies on the History of Logic: Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 33–41. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

"My strategy in this paper is as follows: First I shall examine what may be called Aristotle's definition of possibility. Then I shall explain the use that Alexander of Aphrodisias makes of this definition in an interesting argument of his. And finally I shall try to show that the soundness of this argument depends on a conception of truth that is tacitly presupposed by Aristotle and strongly rejected by Cicero. Some glimpses beyond will round off the picture." (p. 33)

Studi in Italiano

Abbamonte, Giancarlo. 2013. "Cicerone, Alessandro di Afrodisia, Boezio: tre modi di leggere i Topici di Aristotele tra I sec. a.C. e VI d.C." In Aristoteles Romanus. La réception de la science aristotélicienne dans l’Empire gréco-romain, edited by Lehmann, Yves, 341–369. Turnhout: Brepols.

"L’obiettivo del presente studio è di delineare gli stadi ancora visibili della fortuna di cui godette la teoria dei τόποι, elaborata da Aristotele, nel mondo greco-romano, a partire da Cicerone fino al commento e alla monografia che all’operetta ciceroniana dedicò Boezio in piena età ostrogota (c. 520-523), mettendo in luce anche le possibili cause che determinarono l’eclissi del testo aristotelico dal panorama degli studi filosofici nell’Europa occidentale fino alla metà del XX secolo." (p. 342)

(...)

"Il documento che viene cronologicamente dopo Cicerone e che attesta la fortuna del trattato aristotelico anche nei primi secoli dell’impero è l’enorme commentario continuo ai Topici scritto da Alessandro di Afrodisia tra la fine II d.C. e l’inizio del III d.C.: il testo occupa 591 pagine dell’edizione curata da Max Wallies nel 1891 e ci è pervenuto quasi per intero, anche se fortemente interpolato con materiale bizantino sia anonimo sia ascrivibile al commento di Leone Magentino(50)" (pp. 361-362)

(50) Wallies racchiude in parentesi quadre [ ] gli scoli anonimi ed in parentesi quadre doppie [ ] le parti in cui è stato inserito il commentario di Leone Magentino. Su Leone Magentino (fine XII-in. XIII sec.) vd. M. Wallies, “Die griechische Ausleger der aristotelischen Topik”, in Wissenschftliche Beilage zum Programm des Sophien-Gymnasium zu Berlin 65, 1891, p. 1-27;(,,,)
Baldassarri, Mariano. 1986. La logica stoica. Testimonianze e frammenti. Testi originali con introduzione e traduzione commentata, V A: Alessandro di Afrodisia. Dal Commento agli Analitici primi. Dal Commento ai Topici. Como: Libreria Noseda.
Bonelli, Maddalena. 2022. "Alessandro di Afrodisia et il De interpretatione: il caso della proposizione." Rivista di storia della filosofia no. 77:195–207.

Abstract: "This article considers a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the Prior Analytics (in APr., 10, 13-28) concerning the definition of proposal (premiss or proposition). Its interest lies in the fact that Alexander establishes a very articulated relationship between the definition of proposal that we find in Aristotle's Prior Analytics (24a16-17) and that of Apophantic reason (position) in De interpretatione (4, 17a2-3). Nonetheless, the author aims to demonstrate that this relationship is problematic and unnecessary because the definition of proposal in Prior Analytics is in fact independent from the definition of Apophantic reason. However, it is also the author's intention to show why Alexander does this."
Dal Forno, Davide. 2019. "Alessandro di Afrodisia e Proclo sulla dialettica." Elenchos no. 40:165–197.

Abstract: "In this paper I compare Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Proclus’ conceptions of dialectic by discussing a passage from Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topics and texts from Proclus’ Platonic Theology and commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. I show how Alexander takes up Aristotle’s view of dialectic as an argumentative technique that has no specific object but can be put in the service of philosophy e. g. to establish first principles. In a key passage, Alexander quotes some lines from the Parmenides to emphasize that this was also Plato’s view on dialectic. By contrast, Proclus uses the Parmenides as a crucial source for his conception of dialectic as the crowning glory of philosophy, and fiercely criticizes such interpretations of the Parmenides as that of Alexander, which reduce it to the illustration of a logical method. I argue that the difference in their conceptions of dialectic lies in Alexander’s positive and Proclus’ negative view on doxa and on its role in knowledge."
Gili, Luca. 2011. La sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

"Questo lavoro ha come oggetto una esposizione dei principali temi della sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia, delineati a partire dal suo commento agli Analitici Primi di Aristotele.

Il tema finora è stato poco studiato, sebbene negli ultimi anni siano fioriti gli studi dedicati alla filosofia tardoantica. In questa generale riscoperta di un periodo ingiustamente trascurato dalla storiografia precedente, anche Alessandro di Afrodisia è tornato al centro dell’attenzione. Fino ad ora tuttavia la sua sillogistica non è stata oggetto di una indagine complessiva. Dopo la fondamentale edizione critica del commento di Alessandro agli Analitici Primi curata da Maximilien Wallies (cfr. Wallies [1883]), l’unico testo che ha affrontato la logica di Alessandro di Afrodisia nel suo complesso è Volait [1907]. Questa monografia raramente si eleva dall’essere una parafrasi, peraltro utile, di alcune sezioni del commento di Alessandro agli Analitici Primi." (p. 5)

(...)

"Una ricerca che abbia per proprio oggetto la sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia nel suo complesso e che affronti sia la parte categorica che la parte modale potrebbe apparire troppo ampia ed ambiziosa per una trattazione esaustiva.

Ho cercato tuttavia di portare a termine questa impresa, operando evidentemente delle scelte: i capitoli del commento di Alessandro esaminati analiticamente nella mia ricerca sono solo una parte di quelli pervenutici del suo commento. Ho scelto infatti i capitoli o i blocchi di capitoli che credo costituiscano il nocciolo più significativo per la ricostruzione della sillogistica categorica (in Anal. Pr. A, 1-2, 4-7) e modale (in Anal. Pr. A, 3, 8-9, 13-15) del commentatore di Afrodisia." (p. 7)

Riferimenti

Volait [1907], Die Stellung des Alexander von Aphrodisias zur aristotelischen Schlusslehre, G. Volait, Druck von Ehrhardt Karras, Halle, 1907.

Wallies [1883], Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium, edidit M. Wallies, Typis G. Reimeri, Berolini, 1883.
———. 2011. "Boeto di Sidone e Alessandro di Afrodisia intorno alla sillogistica aristotelica." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 154:375–397.

"Boeto di Sidone fu un aristotelico. La tradizione filosofica nella quale egli volle inserirsi è perciò la stessa alla quale appartenne poi Alessandro di Afrodisia, che tuttavia non cita mai espressamente il peripatetico di Sidone nel suo commento agli Analitici Primi di Aristotele.(1)

"La tesi di questo lavoro è che la presentazione della sillogistica di Alessandro sia radicalmente alternativa a quella di Boeto e che ciò possa essere spiegato con un differente approccio dei due autori alla tradizione peripatetica a loro precedente. Questo confronto dottrinale con Boeto, che nel testo di Alessandro rimane implicito, costituisce a mio parere una delle chiavi interpretative che consentono di apprezzare l’originalità della presentazione della sillogistica fornita dall’esegeta di Afrodisia e di fornire una spiegazione di alcune prese di distanza, da parte del commentatore, rispetto a molte tesi di un’autorevole tradizione peripatetica risalente a Teofrasto.(2)" (p. 376)

(1) Alessandro tuttavia doveva conoscere l’opera di Boeto, che sicuramente citava nel suo commento alla Fisica, da cui Simplicio molto probabilmente trasse i frammenti dell’opera di Boeto che ci ha trasmesso con il proprio commento (cfr. P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote, Berlin 2008, 70–71).

(2) Il presente studio non intende stabilire che Alessandro di Afrodisia abbia deliberatamente espresso posizioni alternative a quelle di Boeto di Sidone, perché allo stato attuale delle nostre conoscenze non ci sono evidenze testuali che mostrino la conoscenza e la critica da parte dell’esegeta di Afrodisia della logica di Boeto.

Questo saggio vuole piuttosto stabilire un confronto dottrinale fra le posizioni dei due autori, che occupano un posto di primo rilievo nella storia dell’aristotelismo, per mostrare come sia stata possibile la elaborazione di teorie logiche fra loro così diverse.

[Su Boeto di Sidone si veda: Riccardo Chiaradonna et Marwan Rashed (éds.), Boéthos de Sidon – Exégète d’Aristote et philosophe, Berlin de Gruyter 2020.]
———. 2015. "Il confronto di Giovanni Filopono con Alessandro di Afrodisia intorno al problema della conversione delle proposizioni." Elenchos no. 36:317–338.

Abstract: "In this paper I compare Philoponus’s account of the laws of conversion for categorical and modal propositions with Alexander’s exposition of the same topic. I argue that Philoponus’s main source was Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and that Philoponus had no access to independent sources to reconstruct Theophrastus’s proof for the conversion of universal negative propositions.

I suggest that the different solutions that Alexander and Philoponus offer to the puzzles of the doctrine of the laws of conversion depend on the two commentators’ different exegetical strategies. Alexander tries to solve the puzzles by means of doctrines, which Aristotle expounded elsewhere. Philoponus instead interprets Aristotle’s passage as implying a hierarchy among propositions – a doctrine which is not explicitly present in Aristotle’s text."
Mignucci, Mario. 1983. "Alessandro di Afrodisia e la logica modale di Crisippo." In Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica organizzato dalla Società italiana di logica e filosofia delle scienze (SILFS), San Gimignano, 4-8 dicembre 1982, edited by Abrusci, Michele , Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 47–58. Bologna: CLUEB.

"La logica peripatetica è stata studiata finora comparativamente meno di quella stoica e di quella aristotelica. Per giustificare quest'asserzione dovrei naturalmente chiarire che cosa intendo per 'logica peripatetica'. Non è tuttavia mia intenzione affrontare qui questo complesso problema. Al mio scopo è sufficiente dire che sotto l'etichetta di 'logici peripatetici' raccolgo tutti i commentatori greci delle opere logiche di Aristotele, anche se essi appartengono a scuole filosofiche diverse. Non mi propongo nemmeno di spiegare i motivi per i quali gli storici hanno trascurato questa parte della logica. Mi limito a far presente che fra le ragioni di questo abbandono non c'è quella che i non addetti ai lavori potrebbero sospettare che ci fosse, e cioè che la logica peripatetica è una logica non interessante o, addirittura, una piatta ripetizione dei punti di vista di Aristotele. A prova del fatto che essa merita di essere ripresa in considerazione illustrerò qui alcune delle obiezioni che Alessandro di Afrodisia rivolge contro una tesi di logica modale sostenuta da Crisippo." (p. 47)
———. 2001. "Alessandro di Afrodisia e la logica modale di Aristotele." In Antichi e moderni nella filosofia di età imperiale: atti del II colloquio internazionale: Roma, 21-23 settembre 2000, edited by Brancacci, Aldo, 239–263. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"È ad Albrecht Becker, in un saggio del 1933, che dobbiamo una chiara messa a punto dei problemi interpretativi e di consistenza che le tesi aristoteliche [sulla logica modale] sollevano(2). Da allora la sillogistica modale di Aristotele è stata variamente analizzata e discussa, senza però che si giungesse mai a un'interpretazione capace di dar conto unitariamente delle molte contrastanti affermazioni in essa contenute. Anche gli studi più recenti, sebbene numerosi e molto sofisticati, più che pervenire a un modello interpretativo coerente, hanno soprattutto mostrato che non c'è unanimità fra gli specialisti sulla diagnosi delle ragioni degli errori di Aristotele(3).

Non è senza significato quindi cercare di saggiare 1'approccio di Alessandro a questa parte della dottrina aristotelica, perché il suo compito di commentatore è messo alla prova in una misura che eccede la norma." (p. 240)

(...)

"Naturalmente nel breve arco di questo saggio non potremo esaminare tutto il commento di Alessandro alla sillogistica modale. Ci limiteremo a prendere in considerazione le sue definizioni di possibilità e di attualità e alcune applicazioni di queste definizioni nel contesto della discussione di tesi controverse della sillogistica." (p. 242)

(2) A. Becker, Die aristotelische Theorie der M6glichkeitsschlusse. Eine logisch-philologische Untersuchung der Kapitel 1 3-22 von Aristoteles Analytica Priora I, Berlin 1933.

(3 Tra il 1994 e il 1996 sono stati pubblicati non meno di quattro volumi sulla sillogistica modale di Aristotele. Si veda: F. Buddeensiek, Die Modallogik des Aristoteles in den Analytica Priora A, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 1994; R. Patterson, Aristotle's Modal Logic. Essence and Entailment in the Organon, Cambridge 1995; U. Nortmann, Modale 5yllogismen, möglichen Welten, Essentialismus. Eine Analyse der aristotelischen Modallogik, Berlin-New York 1 996; P. Thom, The Logic of Essentialism. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Modal 5yllogistic, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1996.
Militello, Chiara. 2013. "Il lessico dell'astrazione in Alessandro di Afrodisia." Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana no. 9:302–321.

Abstract: "Analisi dei termini usati per indicare il processo di astrazione che separa forma e materia sia nelle opere attribuite con certezza, sia in quelle dubbie : in particolare, l'uso in tal senso di ἀφαιρέω sembra potersi leggere come indizio di paternità dubbia."

Études en Français

Bonelli, Maddalena. 2009. "Alexandre d'Aphrodise et le « De interpretatione »." In Interpréter le De Interpretatione, edited by Husson, Suzanne, 51–67. Paris: Vrin.

"Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise sur le De interpretatione d’Aristote est perdu, mais on en retrouve plusieurs fragments, ou plutôt des paraphrases, principalement dans le commentaire de Boèce(1). Dans cet article, je considérerai deux de ces « fragments », portant tous deux sur le premier chapitre de l’oeuvre d’Aristote ; mais, auparavant, je présenterai l’arrière-plan, à savoir la tradition dans laquelle le commentaire d’Alexandre s’insère, en commençant brièvement par les autres commentaires anciens sur le De interpretatione." (p, 51)

(1) C. Meiser (ed.), Anicii Manlii Severini Boeti Commentarii in librum Aristotelis PERI ERMENEIAS, editio secunda, Leipzig, Teubner, 1880 (désormais cité In De int. II).
Ferroni, Lorenzo, and Gili, Luca. 2014. "Syllogistique et méréologie chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise: remarques textuelles sur deux passages difficiles du commentaire aux "Premiers analytiques"." Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d’Histoire Anciennes no. 88:91–110.

Résumé : "Examen du texte d’Alex. Aphr., In APr. 60, 21-25 et 129, 33-130, 13. Le premier passage discute le syllogisme catégorique dit « Darii » : il ne faut pas éditer le texte admis, τί δὲ τοῦ Β ἐστὶ τὸ Γ (c’est-à-dire que tout Γ est une partie de Β, soit que B est dit de tout Γ), car on ne peut le déduire de la prémisse mineure qui précède. Il faut donc éditer τὶ δὲ τοῦ Β ἐστί <τι> τοῦ Γ (« quelque chose de B est quelque chose de Γ ») pour que l’argumentation soit valide. Cette tournure trouve des parallèles en Alex. Aphr., In APr. 34, 9-10 ; 121, 33-122, 1 ; 174, 23-24, etc. Dans le second passage, il faut placer les guillemets fermants en 130, 1, après ἐξ ἀνάγκης : il s’agit d’une version modale du « dici de omni et de nullo » employée par Alexandre pour résoudre le problème de la validité de « Barbara LX-L ». En 130, 4-5, l’expression impliquant ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ne se laisse pas comprendre comme une affirmation de la position d’Alexandre lui-même mais comme une objection fictive qui est fautive. En 130, 11, la reconstruction du raisonnement d’Alexandre indique qu’il faut restituer une virgule après ὄντων, rejeter l’ajouter de δέ au profit du οὕτως des manuscrits et ajouter un point-en-haut après αὐτῶν."
Gavray, Marc-Antoine. 2005. "Premiers analytiques, 25a14-17: Alexandre d'Aphrodise et autres interprétations." In Logique et ontologie : perspectives diachroniques et synchroniques : liber amicorum in honorem Huberti Hubiani, edited by Beets, François and Gavray, Marc-Antoine, 1–17. Liège: Édiitons de l’Université de Liège.
Guyomarc'h, Gweltaz. 2013. "Les sources post-hellénistiques du questionnaire de Porphyre." Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 13:1–23.

Résumé : Le début de l'Isagogè de Porphyre énonce une série de trois questions à propos des genres et des espèces, que l'on tient pour l'origine de la médiévale « Querelle des universaux ». Mais la question s'est posée aux interprètes de savoir si, dans ce texte, Porphyre se référait à certaines thèses historiquement déterminées ou bien s'il construisait ces alternatives de façon théorique, dans une lingua franca non connotée d'un point de vue doctrinal. Cet article, en se concentrant sur la première alternative du questionnaire, tente de montrer que le texte porphyrien prend davantage sens si l'on s'avise que l'époque post-hellénistique (IIe s. av. J.-C. – début du IIIe s. ap.J.-C.) donne déjà à voir une polémique scolaire sur le statut des universaux. Ce n'est ainsi pas seulement le vocabulaire employé par Porphyre qui est doctrinalement connoté, mais l'alternative elle-même, qui fait très probablement référence à un débat entre les thèses platoniciennes, stoïciennes et péripatéticiennes. Alexandre d'Aphrodise constitue une aide précieuse pour reconstruire ce débat, dont l'article esquisse une cartographie."

Abstract: "At the beginning of his Isagoge, Porphyry establishes a famous set of questions concerning genera and species, which is the origin of the medieval “Quarrel of universals”. But this text gave rise to difficulty for interpreters: does Porphyry, when elaborating this set of questions, refer to historical positions or does he offer these alternatives in a lingua franca, which would be neutral from a doctrinal point of view? This article focusing on the first of the three alternatives raised by Porphyry aims to show that replacing Porphyry's text in its historical and philosophical background can shed light on the meaning of this alternative. During the Post-Hellenistic period (100 B.C.–200 A.D.), the different schools discussed the ontological status of universals. Therefore, not only does Porphyry use the terminology shaped by former philosophers, but he also alludes to the debate between Stoics, Middle Platonists and Peripatetics. Alexander of Aphrodisias constitutes a precious help to reconstruct this dispute, which this article tries to depict."
Guyomarc’h, Gweltaz. 2017. "« Métaphysique » et « Organon » selon Alexandre d’Aphrodise : l’utilité de la logique pour la philosophie première." In Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la métaphysique aristotélicienne, edited by Balansard, Anne and Jaulin, Annick, 83–117. Leuven: Peeters.

"si, comme on le dit, Alexandre d’Aphrodise travaille à «systématiser» l’oeuvre d’Aristote (en un sens qui reste pour partie à déterminer), il est légitime de s’interroger sur la façon dont il conçoit les frontières entre

les différentes disciplines dans la cartographie aristotélicienne des savoirs.

Dans le cas de la métaphysique, ce sont les relations avec deux types de discours qui méritent en priorité un examen: d’une part, la physique, pour d’évidentes raisons internes à l’aristotélisme; d’autre part, la logique, pour des raisons qui tiennent aussi au contexte d’Alexandre. C’est à cette dernière que l’on souhaite s’intéresser ci-dessous. On voudrait plus précisément essayer d’éclairer le sens et la portée de trois passages du Commentaire à la Métaphysique, trois textes qui font explicitement se croiser logique et métaphysique." (p. 83)
Hugonnard-Roche, Henri. 2015. "Les épîtres syriaques de Sévère Sebokht et leurs sources grecques." Studia greco-arabica no. 5:53–104.

"Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to provide the edition, with translation and commentary, of a short Syriac epistle by Severus Sebokht, bishop of Qenneshre (7th century), in which the author discusses some issues related to Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias and Analytics. The commentary examines in detail Severus’ Syriac text by comparison with the Greek sources, namely the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, and Philoponus. In addition, in an appendix a study is included of a part of another epistle by Severus, concerning the existence of the possible, which shows a remarkable similarity with Alexander’s Question II 4."
Lafleur, Claude. 2012. "Alexandre d’Aphrodise et l’abstraction selon l’exposé sur les universaux chez Boèce dans son Second commentaire sur l’« Isagoge » de Porphyre »." Laval théologique et philosophique no. 68:35–89.

Avec la collaboration de Joanne Carrier.

Résumé : "Cette première traduction française d’une portion significative de l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, en regard d’un texte latin reponctué en conséquence et accompagné d’annotations critiques, est précédée d’une présentation historico-doctrinale mettant en relief le rôle — à la fois central et problématique — de l’abstraction dans la solution boécienne, ouvertement rattachée à Alexandre d’Aphrodise (dont le traité De l’âme est ici examiné), du statut des genres et des espèces dans ce texte qui, à travers l’exégèse du célèbre questionnaire porphyrien, a fait connaître le problème des universaux à l’Occident latin et en est demeuré l’expression la plus achevée jusqu’au XIIe siècle, où Abélard en a donné un métacommentaire particulièrement brillant dans sa Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium, éditée, traduite et étudiée ci-après dans ce numéro thématique."

Abstract: "This first French translation of a relevant portion of the In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, in parallel with a consequently reponctuated and critically annotated Latin text, is preceded by a historico-doctrinal presentation highlighting the role — both central and problematic — of abstraction in the Boethian solution, openly linked to Alexander of Aphrodisias (whose treatise On soul is here examined), of the status of genera and species in this text which, through the exegesis of the well-known porphyrian questionary, has revealed the problem of universals to the Latin West and remained its most achieved expression until the 12th century, where Abelard wrote on those pages a particularly brilliant metacommentary in his Logica Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, edited, translated and studied hereafter in this thematic issue."
Moraux, Paul. 1979. Le Commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise aux «Seconds Analytiques» d'Aristote. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Les fragments du commentaire perdu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise aux Seconde Analytiques d'Aristote devaient, en principe, être présentés dans le troisième volume de mon Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, qui sera consacré tout entier â l'oeuvre d'Alexandre. Sans doute n'en aurais-je abordé l'examen que dans quelques années, si le thème proposé pour le huitième Symposium Aristotelicum (Padoue, 7-15 septembre 1978), â savoir l'étude des Seconde Analytiques eux-mêmes, ne m'avait incité â modifier mon plan de travail pour rassembler plus tôt que je ne l'aurais fait autrement les restes du commentaire d'Alexandre â ce traité.

Dans les pages qui suivent, on trouvera, groupés dans l'ordre même du texte commenté, les témoignages anciens qui peuvent être rapportés, avec certitude ou avec une assez grande probabilité, au commentaire perdu. J'y ai joint les principaux passages parallèles, ceux-ci nous montrant que les commentateurs grecs ont souvent puisé à l'ouvrage d'Alexandre sans mentionner leur source. Aux textes grecs eux-mêmes font suite quelques brèves explications; elles n'ont pas la prétention de résoudre tous les problèmes soulevés par le texte d'Aristote ou par le commentaire d'Alexandre; elles sont avant tout destinées à aider le lecteur, soit en lui rappelant quelles déclarations d'Aristote ont provoqué les remarques du commentateur, soit en éclairant d'une courte paraphrase le texte, parfois difficile, des interprétations de l'Exégète. Mon étude est donc avant tout philologique. J'espère pourtant que les philosophes qui étudieront les Seconds Analytiques trouveront matière à réflexion dans les vestiges, trop maigres, hélas! d'un commentaire qui, tant par son contenu que par l'influence qu'il a exercée, fait date dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme." (Avant-Propos, pp. VII-VIII)
Rashed, Marwan. 2011. "Un corpus de logique anti-platonicienne d'Alexandre d’Aphrodise." In Plato, Aristotle or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and Aristotelianism in Antiquity, edited by Bénatouïl, Thomas, Maffi, Emanuele and Trabattoni, Franco, 85–94. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Repris dans M. Rashed, L'Héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l'Antiquité, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2016.

Deutsche Studien

Lee, Tae-Soo. 1984. Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike. Eine Untersuchung über die Kommentare zu den Analytica priora von Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Ammonius und Philoponus. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Volait, Georges. 1907. Die Stellung des Alexander von Aphrodisias zur aristotelischen Schlusslehre. Halle a.d.S.: Ehrhardt Karras.

Reprint: New York, Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1975.
Weidemann, Hermann. 1997. "Ein drittes modallogisches Argument für den Determinismus: Alexander von Aphrodisias." In Das weite Spektrum der analytischen Philosophie: Festschrift für Franz von Kutschera, edited by Lenzen, Wolfgang, 429–446. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Estudios en Español

Correria, Manuel. 2024. "El silogismo como combinación en Alejandro de Afrodisias." Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía no. 92:177–190.

Resumen: "En el antiguo comentario a la lógica aristotélica, el vocablo griego συζυγία (syzygía) se refiere a un par de proposiciones que tienen uno o ambos términos en común. Esta voz griega se presenta como el género desde donde se especifican las tres reglas deductivas de la lógica aristotélica: conversión (si ambos términos son comunes, pero cambian su posición), oposición (si ambos términos son comunes, pero no cambian su posición) y silogismo (si un solo término es común y cambia su posición). Esta enseñanza no es explícita en Aristóteles, pero ya es conocida por su principal comentarista Alejandro de Afrodisias.

En este artículo se muestra que la presencia de esta enseñanza, que mira al silogismo como una combinación (syzygía), conduce a describir la silogística como la actividad que busca las premisas que justifican una conclusión, que es la tarea de la dialéctica de los Tópicos de Aristóteles y lo que explica por qué el comentario de Alejandro propone un contexto dialéctico para discutir la silogística en APr. Finalmente, sobre la base de que el uso del término syzygía está atestiguado en autores contemporáneos y anteriores a Alejandro, como Cicerón, Galeno y Apuleyo, el artículo sugiere que la elaboración y transmisión de esta enseñanza está relacionada con una fuente anterior, quien podría ser el discípulo de Aristóteles, Teofrasto de Ereso."

Abstract: "In the ancient commentary on Aristotelian logic, the Greek word συζυγία (syzygía) refers to a pair of propositions that have one or both terms in common. This Greek voice is presented as the genus from which the three deductive rules of Aristotelian logic are specified: conversion (if both terms are common, but change their position), opposition (if both terms are common, but do not change their position) and syllogism (if a single term is common and changes its position). This teaching is not explicit

in Aristotle, but it is already known by his main commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. This article shows that the presence of this teaching leads to describe syllogistic as the activity that seeks the premises that justify a conclusion, which is the task of the dialectic of Aristotle’s Topics and explains why Alexander’s commentary proposes a dialectical context to discuss syllogistic in Prior Analytics. Finally, on the basis that the use of the term syzygía is attested in authors contemporary and prior to Alexander, such as Cicero, Apuleius and Galen, the article suggests that the elaboration and transmission of this teaching is related to an earlier source, who could be Aristotle’s disciple, Theophrastus of Eresus."
Salles, Ricardo. 2009. "Alejandro de Afrodisia y el problema de la instrumentalidad de la lógica. Notas sobre in A. Pr. 2, 22-33." Estudios de Filosofía no. 40:223–243.

Resumen: La contribución de Ricardo Salles se centra en la interpretación peripatética de Alejandro en contra de la tesis estoica de que la lógica no es “instrumento”, sino “parte” de la filosofía. Según Alejandro, si la lógica fuera parte de la filosofía, como pretenden los estoicos, la filosofía no podría ocupar el lugar más elevado en la jerarquía del conocimiento; pero esto sería, en cierto modo, paradójico, argumenta Salles, pues todos –tanto estoicos como peripatéticos– consideran, por diversas razones, que la filosofía es, por su objeto, la disciplina más elevada. De acuerdo con Salles, sin embargo, esta aguda crítica no es lo suficientemente penetrante para poner de manifiesto una verdadera inconsistencia en el estoicismo.

Salles cree que esto sería paradójico, pues todos –tanto estoicos como peripatéticos– consideran, por diversas razones, que la filosofía es, por su objeto, la disciplina más elevada. De acuerdo con Salles, sin embargo, la aguda crítica de Alejandro no es lo suficientemente penetrante para poner de manifiesto una verdadera inconsistencia en el estoicismo. Su principal debilidad, en su opinión, radica en el hecho de que el razonamiento sobre el cual descansa depende de supuestos aristotélicos que los estoicos rechazan."

Abstract: "Ricardo Salles’ contribution is focused on Alexander’s Peripatetic interpretation against the Stoic thesis that logic is not an “instrument”, but a “part” of philosophy. According to Alexander, if logic were part of philosophy, as the Stoics maintain, philosophy could not occupy the highest place in the hierarchy of knowledge. Salles takes this to be paradoxical since both the Stoics and the Peripatetics consider that philosophy is, due to its object, the highest discipline. According to Salles, Alexander’s acute criticism is not penetrating enough to make obvious a real inconsistency in Stoicism. In his view, Alexander’s main weakness is that the reasoning on which such criticism is based depends upon some Aristotelian assumptions that the Stoics reject."

Skip to the top